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1 Introduction
Conversations often involve an element of plan-
ning and calculation of what to say to best achieve
one’s interests. We investigate scenarios of incom-
plete knowledge in strategic conversations, where
the fundamental interests of the dialogue agents
are opposed. For instance, a debate between two
political candidates. Each candidate has a certain
number of points she wants to convey to the au-
dience, and each wants to promote her own posi-
tion to the expense of the other’s. To achieve these
goals each participant needs to plan for anticipated
responses from the other. Debates are thus games;
an agent may win, lose or draw. Similar strategic
reasoning about what one says is a staple of board
room or faculty meetings, bargaining sessions, etc.
We show the importance of a certain form of un-
awareness in strategic conversation.
We explore a linguistic consequence of the
model of strategic conversation of (Asher and
Paul, 2012; Asher and Paul, 2013) concerning a
form of incomplete information, where one strate-
gic player is unaware of moves that another player
may perform. We show some interesting linguistic
consequences of the model concerning this form
of incomplete information and draw an abstract
characterization of the structure of strategic con-
versations from the framework. This work com-
plements more computational and empirical work
like that of (Traum, 2008).
Background. For their model of strategic
conversations, (Asher and Paul, 2012) use Ba-
nach Mazur or BM games, a kind of infinitary
game (Kechris, 1995) used in mathematics and
theoretical computer science. A BM game is a
win-lose game 〈Xω,Win〉 involving two players;
the 2 players each play a finite sequence of moves
from a fixed set or vocabulary X , alternating in-
definitely and building strings in Xω; Win ⊆ Xω
is the winning condition for player 0 (for player 1
the winning condition is Xω −Win). The Cantor
topology over Xω of infinite strings allows us to
characterize winning conditions in terms of basic
open sets, unions of basic open sets (Σ01), intersec-
tions of complements of basic open sets (Π01), and
so on. The Borel hierarchy consists of the Σ01 sets,
the Π01 sets, and more generally includes Σ
0
α+1 as
the countable union of allΠ0α sets andΠ
0
α+1 as the
complement of Σ0
α+1 sets. The hierarchy is strict
and does not collapse (Kechris, 1995).
(Asher and Paul, 2012) characterize types of di-
alogues and their conversational goals using the
BM framework. Message exchange games are
BM games 〈Xω,Win〉 where X is a set of possi-
ble discourse moves, as described by, e.g., SDRT
(Asher and Lascarides, 2003). BM games char-
acterize in a precise way how some conversa-
tional strategies, and some winning conditions in
strategic conversations, are much more complex
than others. (Asher and Paul, 2012) also show
how two conversationalists 0 and 1 may occupy a
role in two different BM games such that 0 and
1 may both have winning strategies (1 in each
game) and how this applies to cases of misdirec-
tion (Asher and Lascarides, 2013). Finally, BM
games also can model why speakers do not “de-
fect” when given the opportunity and it is in their
interest. Consider a prosecutor who asks a defen-
dant a question that may incriminate her and that
she prefers not to answer. In a one shot linguistic
exchange, it is not rational to answer such a ques-
tion. However, if linguistic games are open ended
allowing for further exchanges, then a defection
strategy may carry heavy, known penalties.
Our contribution. BM games are determined
(Martin, 1975); so if 0 and 1 are playing a game
G in which each has complete common knowl-
edge of the moves and strategies of the other, it
is not rational for both 0 and 1 to play with a
strict preference for winning. If they do play with
such a preference, they must not have common and
complete knowledge of the game they are playing.
We investigate two scenarios of incomplete and
non-common knowledge: one is where the play-
ers are playing with different sets of moves and
so the moves of one are not completely known
to the other; the other is where players start out
with the same repertoire of moves, but one for-
gets (or learns) certain moves and the other does
not. In both scenarios the players are playing dif-
ferent games G and G′ with sets of moves X and
Y respectively such that X ( Y . In this case,
one player will be unaware of some of the moves
available to the other.
A question then is: if player 0 strategizes for
Win φ, what happens to φ in the game where
player 1 has a set of moves available to him that
is a strict superset of those 0 is aware of? (Asher
and Paul, 2013) prove an abstract result showing
that WinX encoded inG
′ may have a higher Borel
complexity. For our part we are just interested in
the restriction of the theorem that states that a win-
ning condition that has complexity Σ01 in G will
jump to Σ02 in G
′.
We illustrate the theorem’s import with an ex-
cerpt from the Dan Quayle-Lloyd Bentsen Vice-
Presidential debate of 1988. Quayle, as a
very junior and politically inexperienced Vice-
Presidential candidate, was repeatedly questioned
about his experience and his qualifications to be
President. Quayle’s strategy to rebut doubts about
his qualifications was to compare his experience
to the young John Kennedy’s. However, Bentsen
made a discourse move that Quayle didn’t antici-
pate.
(1) Quayle: ... the question you’re asking
is, ”What kind of qualifications does Dan
Quayle have to be president,” [...] I have
as much experience in the Congress as
Jack Kennedy did when he sought the
presidency.
(2) Bensten: Senator, I served with Jack
Kennedy. I knew Jack Kennedy. Jack
Kennedy was a friend of mine. Senator,
you’re no Jack Kennedy.
Quayle’s strategy at that point fell apart, and
he lost the debate handily. He was unprepared
for Bentsen’s move, which we model by having
Quayle play a game with set of moves X and
Bentsen a game with set of moves Y such that
X ( Y .
The theorem implies that a winning strategy for
Quayle’s winning condition—implicating that he
was comparable to a very distinguished President
(a Σ1 winning condition)—would have needed to
take into account an intersection of open sets in
Y defining the X winning condition in Y thus
anticipating possible deviations from the conver-
sational plays in X . Had he done so, he might
have countered Bentsen’s move and have kept the
moves within X . A linguistic theory of discourse
structure like SDRT tells us how:
Proposition 1
If a move α presupposes φ and φ is not locally
accommodatable in α and a move β is such that
β |= ¬φ, then there is no link between α and β.
I.e. α cannot be a response to β.
In this case, Bentsen’s move presupposes that
Quayle had implicated or said that he was compa-
rable to John Kennedy, a presupposition that is not
locally acommodatable (to Bentsen’s move). Had
Quayle explicitly added a rider to his response,
like though I would not presume to be the great
statesman that Kennedy was, I have as much ex-
perience as he did when he sought the presidency,
Bentsen’s move would have been incoherent and
would have put him in a position to lose the de-
bate.
BM games offer a simple and elegant way of
describing a heretofore little studied form of un-
awareness, an unawareness of moves in the game
instead of an unawareness of events (Haifetz et
al., 2006). It is the former that is appropriate for
the analysis of strategic conversation. Our obser-
vations provide a general characterization of the
structure of strategic conversations, assuming that
our dialogue agents are rational and are perfect
reasoners, thus able to determine whether a win-
ning strategy exists in the game they are playing.
Proposition 2 Two rational players of a BM mes-
sage exchange game assign a strict preference to
their winning conditions only if they (i) are play-
ing two games with compatible Win conditions,
or (ii) assume they are playing a game where their
opponent is unaware of some of their moves.
Case (i) is the misdirection scenario; case (ii) in-
cludes both cases of forgetting and of assuming
your opponent doesn’t know all of your rhetorical
repertoire. The result resembles exceptions due to
unawareness of no speculative trade theorems in
economics (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982).
References
N. Asher and A. Lascarides. 2003. Logics of Conver-
sation. Cambridge University Press.
N. Asher and A. Lascarides. 2013. Strategic con-
versation. Semantics and Pragmatics, 6(2):http://
dx.doi.org/10.3765/sp.6.2.
N. Asher and S. Paul. 2012. Conversations as Banach-
Mazur games. Dialogue and Discourse (submitted).
N. Asher and S. Paul. 2013. Infinite games with un-
certain moves. In Proceedings of the First Interna-
tional Workshop on Strategic Reasoning, pages 25–
32, Rome.
A. Haifetz, M. Meier, and B. Schipper. 2006. Inter-
active unawareness. Journal of Economic Theory,
130:78–94.
A. Kechris. 1995. Classical Descriptive Set Theory.
New York: Springer-Verlag.
D. A. Martin. 1975. Borel determinacy. Annals of
Mathematics, 102(2):363–371.
Paul Milgrom and Nancy Stokey. 1982. Information,
trade and common knowledge. Journal of Economic
Theory, 26(1):17–27.
D. Traum. 2008. Computational models of non-
cooperative dialogue. In Proceedings of the Interna-
tional Workshop on the Semantics and Pragmatics of
Dialogue (LONDIAL), London.
